Do Chinese domestic firms benefit from FDI inflow? Evidence of horizontal and vertical spillovers by LIN, Ping et al.
Lingnan University 
Digital Commons @ Lingnan University 
Staff Publications Lingnan Staff Publication 
12-1-2009 
Do Chinese domestic firms benefit from FDI inflow? Evidence of 
horizontal and vertical spillovers 
Ping LIN 
Lingnan University, Hong Kong 
Zhuomin LIU 
University of Pittsburgh, United States 
Yifan ZHANG 
Lingnan University, Hong Kong 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.ln.edu.hk/sw_master 
 Part of the Industrial Organization Commons, and the International Economics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lin, P., Liu, Z., & Zhang, Y. (2009). Do Chinese domestic firms benefit from FDI inflow? Evidence of 
horizontal and vertical spillovers. China Economic Review, 20(4), 677-691. doi: 10.1016/
j.chieco.2009.05.010 
This Journal article is brought to you for free and open access by the Lingnan Staff Publication at Digital Commons 
@ Lingnan University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Staff Publications by an authorized administrator of 
Digital Commons @ Lingnan University. 
Do Chinese Domestic Firms Benefit from FDI Inflow? 
Evidence of Horizontal and Vertical Spillovers* 
 
 
Ping Lin
§
 
Department of Economics 
Lingnan University 
Hong Kong 
 
Zhuomin Liu 
Department of Economics 
University of Pittsburgh 
Pittsburgh, PA 15260  
 
Yifan Zhang 
Department of Economics 
Lingnan University 
Hong Kong 
 
May 2009 
 
Abstract: Using a large panel dataset covering all manufacturing firms (above a minimum 
scale) in China from 1998 to 2005, this paper examines whether there exist productivity 
spillovers from foreign direct investment (FDI) to domestic firms. In estimating 
productivity, we control for a possible simultaneity bias by using semi-parametric 
estimation techniques. We find that Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan (HMT) invested 
firms generate negative horizontal spillovers, while Non-HMT foreign invested firms 
(mostly from OECD countries) tend to bring positive horizontal spillovers in China. 
These two opposing horizontal effects seem to cancel out at the aggregate level. We also 
find strong and robust vertical spillover effects on both state-owned firms and non-state 
firms. However, vertical spillover effects from export-oriented FDI are weaker than those 
from domestic-market-oriented FDI.  
 
 
JEL Classification: F21, L14, O53 
Keywords: Foreign Direct Investment, Spillovers, China 
                                                 
*
 We would like to thank co-editor Jeffrey Zax and an anonymous referee for their useful suggestions 
which improved the quality of the paper substantially. We would also like to thank Daniel Berkowitz, 
Loren Brandt, K. Y. Cheung, Deborah Davis, Simon Fan, Ying Fang, Lok-Sang Ho, Chang-Tai Hsieh, 
Yasheng Huang, W. L. Lai, Thomas Rawski, Christopher Udry, Thomas Voon, and Xiangdong Wei, and 
seminar participants at Lingnan University, University of Pittsburgh and Yale University for their helpful 
comments and discussions. Financial support from Lingnan University is acknowledged (Funding # 
DR07B4). 
§
 Corresponding author. Department of Economics, Lingnan University, Tuen Mun, N.T., Hong Kong. 
Email: plin@ln.edu.hk. 
 1 
1. Introduction 
 
It is by now well recognized that inward foreign direct investment (FDI) can benefit the 
host country by generating spillovers to the rest of the economy, in addition to bringing in 
capital.1 In fact, one of the primary motivations for governments around the world to 
attract foreign direct investment is the belief that the presence of FDI will benefit 
domestic firms. World Bank (1993) writes that “FDI brings with it considerable benefits: 
technology transfer, management know-how, and export marketing access. Many 
developing countries will need to be more effective in attracting FDI flows if they are to 
close the technology gap with high-income countries, upgrade managerial skills, and 
develop their export markets.” These claims have encouraged developing countries as 
well as developed countries to create costly programs, such as tax breaks, subsidized 
industrial infrastructure, and duty exemptions, in order to attract FDI. From 1991 to 2002, 
developing countries made over 1,500 regulatory changes favorable to FDI (UNCTAD, 
2003, p.21). Despite its importance to policy choices, recent empirical studies on FDI 
spillovers find mixed results. In a summary of the existing evidence, Rodrik (1999, p.37) 
concludes, “today’s policy literature is filled with extravagant claims about positive 
spillovers from FDI, but the hard evidence is sobering.” 
 
According to the theories, FDI spillovers can work through a number of channels. First, 
domestic firms can benefit from the presence of FDI in the same industry, leading to 
intra-industry or horizontal spillovers, through labor turnover, demonstration effects and 
competition effects. Second, there may be spillovers from foreign invested firms 
operating in other industries, leading to inter-industry or vertical spillovers. This type of 
spillover effect is often attributed to buyer-supplier linkages and therefore may be 
towards upstream (backward spillovers) or downstream industries (forward spillovers).  
 
This paper examines the extent of FDI spillovers using firm-level panel data from 
China’s manufacturing sector. Our dataset covers all state-owned firms and all non-state 
                                                 
1
 See Moran (1998) for a comprehensive survey of the effects of FDI on economic development of host 
countries. 
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firms with sales above 5 million Yuan from 1998 through 2005. The number of firms in 
our dataset ranges from 124,944 in 1998 to 243,974 in 2005. China is of particular 
interest because it is the largest economy among developing countries, and more 
importantly one of the largest recipients of FDI in the world. Guided by FDI-oriented 
philosophy, Chinese governments at all levels compete aggressively with each other to 
offer tax breaks and other incentives to foreign investors. Figure 1 shows the basic trend 
of FDI inflow into China between 1983 and 2006. 
 
The general approach in this paper is to regress firm-level total factor productivity (TFP) 
on measures of foreign presence in the firm’s related industries. We use panel data 
models to remove the effects of unobservable firm-specific variables. In line with 
previous studies such as Pavcnik (2002) and Javorcik (2004), we employ a semi-
parametric estimation technique following Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) to get consistent 
estimates of TFP. We use China’s 2002 input-output table to calculate the measures of 
vertical linkages of Chinese industries.  
 
In the paper, we examine both the horizontal and vertical spillovers of FDI, as well 
analyzing the market orientation of FDI, the geographic/cultural origin of FDI, and the 
ownership of domestic firms. We find that export-oriented FDI is not very different from 
domestic-market-oriented FDI in that we find the same positive backward and forward 
spillovers. In addition, Chinese statistics identify two types of foreign invested firms in 
China: those invested from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan (HMT), and those invested 
by foreign investors from countries in other regions (mainly from the OECD countries). 
We find that HMT firms bring negative horizontal spillovers, whereas Non-HMT firms 
tend to generate positive horizontal spillovers. We believe this is because many of the 
HMT firms are labor intensive and compete more intensively with domestic firms, 
compared with foreign invested firms from the OECD countries. We find strong and 
consistent positive forward spillovers of FDI on Chinese firms, in all estimation 
specifications. Backward spillovers can only be found from Non-HMT invested firms, 
however. When we compare the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-state enterprises 
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(Non-SOEs), we find consistent evidence of vertical FDI spillovers on both types of firms, 
although the magnitude of the vertical spillover effects is larger for SOEs. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the 
literature. Section 3 describes the evolution of FDI in China. Section 4 discusses the data 
and the measurement issues. Estimation strategy is presented in Section 5. In Section 6, 
we report the results of the econometric tests and compare our results with those of 
previous studies. The paper concludes with Section 7. 
 
 
2. Overview of FDI Spillover Channels 
2.1 Horizontal Spillovers 
Horizontal spillovers of FDI take place when the presence of FDI increases the 
productivity of the domestic firms in the same industry. Teece (1977) argues that such 
spillovers can occur through various channels. The first channel is the demonstration 
effect. Domestic firms may be able to reduce the innovation costs simply by observing 
and imitating the foreign invested firms. The second channel is labor turnover. Workers 
employed and trained by foreign invested firms may join domestic firms or create their 
own firms. The third channel is the competition effect. The entry of foreign invested 
firms can force domestic firms to restructure and improve their production techniques and 
management. However, the increased intensity of competition may hurt domestic firms at 
least in the short run by reducing their market share and output. As shown by Aitken and 
Harrison (1999), the productivity of domestic firms would fall if they have to spread their 
fixed costs over smaller sales volume. This is usually interpreted as a crowding-out effect. 
Also, entry of foreign invested firms may also raise labor costs of domestic firms. Since 
foreign invested firms often pay higher wages, they may raise wages for all firms in 
competitive labor markets (Aitken, Harrison, and Lipsey, 1996). Theoretically, therefore 
the net horizontal effect of FDI on domestic firms is inconclusive; it depends on the 
relative magnitudes of the positive technological spillovers and the negative crowding-
out effect. 
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There are two generations of empirical studies on horizontal effects. The first generation 
is characterized by industry-level studies. A partial list includes Caves (1974) for 
Australia, Globerman (1979) for Canada, and Blomstrom and Persson (1983) for Mexico. 
Most of the first generation studies find a positive correlation between FDI and industry 
productivity. Since most of them use cross-sectional data, it is difficult to distinguish 
whether FDI actually increases domestic firms’ productivity, or whether foreign investors 
are simply attracted to the high-productivity industries.  
 
The second generation of empirical studies is based on firm-level panel data. The 
advantage of the panel data approach is that it can control for foreign investor selection 
bias. These studies examine whether foreign presence increases the productivity of the 
firms in the same industry. The results, however, have been mixed. In a study of 
Venezuelan factories, Aitken and Harrison (1999) find net negative benefits to domestic 
firms, a result that they attribute to the crowding-out effect. Other studies that find 
negative spillovers include Haddad and Harrison (1993) for Morocco, Djankov and 
Hoekman (2000) for the Czech Republic, Konings (2001) for Bulgaria, Romania, and 
Poland, and Javorcik (2004) for Lithuania. In contrast, studies on developed countries 
often find evidence of positive spillovers. They include Castellani and Zanfei (2002) for 
Italy, Keller and Yeaple (2003) for the United States, Gorg and Strobl (2003) for Ireland, 
and Haskel, Pereira, and Slaughter (2007) for the United Kingdom.  
 
2.2. Vertical Spillovers 
In their review of the literature on productivity spillovers, Blomstrom and Kokko (1998) 
point out that “local firms may be able to improve their productivity as a result of forward 
or backward linkages with MNC affiliates.” Backward spillovers of FDI refer to the 
technology transfer through supply chains from foreign invested firms to domestic 
suppliers. Similarly, forward spillovers occur when domestic firms gain access to new or 
less costly intermediate inputs as a result of the foreign investment in upstream industries. 
If foreign invested firms are successful at preventing the leakage of their firm-specific 
knowledge to domestic competitors in the same industry, there is no scope for intra-
industry technology spillovers. It is possible, however, that foreign invested firms 
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voluntarily or involuntarily help increase the productivity of domestic suppliers through 
backward linkages. Lall (1980) notes that technology transfer from multinationals to local 
suppliers can take place in several ways. A multinational might (1) help prospective 
suppliers set up production capacities; (2) provide technical assistance to raise the quality 
of suppliers’ products and to facilitate innovations; (3) provide training and help in 
management and organization (also see UNCTAD, 2001).  
 
Several factors may affect multinationals’ decisions to transfer technology to local 
suppliers and their effects on the degree of backward linkages. First, as Rodriguez-Clare 
(1996) points out, if a multinational can easily access international market and import 
intermediate goods from overseas, it will choose the channel that yields the highest profit. 
In particular, it may choose to import the intermediate goods for quality considerations 
for instance, instead of sourcing them locally. For example, in the 1990s, China’s 
machine tool and aircraft industries suffered significant decline partly because their 
downstream customers insisted to source intermediate goods from overseas markets. 
Such displacement of pre-existing linkages, as emphasized in Rodriguez-Clare (1996), 
could be detrimental to the host country. Second, even if the foreign investors source 
locally, their local suppliers may fail to learn and absorb the technology to be transferred 
if they are far behind their foreign partners in productivity (Smarzynska, 2002). Finally, 
entry of foreign investors can also lower the degree of backward linkages with domestic 
suppliers if the foreign investors require its domestic suppliers to cease supplying other 
downstream firms as a condition for transferring its technology. Lin and Saggi (2007) 
show that such exclusive technology transfer arrangements can indeed emerge in 
equilibrium and hurt the domestic economy in terms of both vertical linkages and 
welfare.
2
 
 
Evidence of technology transfer through vertical supply chains is well documented in 
case studies. For example, MacDuffe and Helper (1997) provide a rich description of 
technology transfer to U.S. parts suppliers following the entry of Japanese car makers. 
Driffield et al. (2002) examine vertical spillovers with industry level data from the UK. 
                                                 
2
 See Lin and Saggi (2005) for a survey of the theoretical literature on FDI and backward linkages.  
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Blalock (2002) analyzes Indonesian firms and Javorcik (2004) studies a panel dataset 
from Lithuanian industries, both of which find positive FDI spillovers through backward 
linkages. Gorodnichenko, Svejar and Terrell (2007) use firm-level data from 17 former 
Eastern European countries to test both horizontal and vertical FDI spillovers. They find 
that backward spillovers are consistently positive; horizontal spillovers are mostly 
insignificant; and forward spillovers are positive only for old and service sector firms. 
They also find that lack of absorptive capability on the part of domestic firms tends to 
dampen spillovers. Most recently, Girma, Görg and Pisu (2007) studies FDI spillovers in 
U.K. and find that both horizontal and vertical spillovers depend on export orientation of 
foreign invested firms.  
 
 
3. Foreign Direct Investment in China 
 
Since the late 1970s, China has aggressively pursued policies that encourage FDI inflow. 
It is not surprising that China developed its first law governing foreign investment in 
1979, while the first law relevant to domestic firms was not enacted until 1988.
3
 The 
amount of China’s FDI inflow has increased dramatically from $6.33 billion in 1985 to 
$69.5 billion in 2006.
4
 China’s accumulative FDI reached $750 billion by the end of June 
in 2007.
5
 Foreign invested firms accounted for 10.6 percent of total investment in fixed 
assets, 31.6 percent of total industrial output, and 58.9 percent of foreign trade in 2006.
6
 
 
Hong Kong is the most important source of FDI in China. In 2006, Hong Kong invested 
20.2 billion dollars in China, accounting for 32.1 percent of the total.
7
 Other major 
sources of FDI include Japan, United States, South Korea, Taiwan and Virgin Islands.
8
 In 
recent years, an increasing share of FDI came from global giants in OECD countries such 
                                                 
3
 Source: Table 11.1, Clarke, Murrell and Whiting (2008). 
4
 Source: Table 18-1, China Statistical Yearbook (2007). 
5
 Source, “Cumulative FDI in China Exceeds 750 Billion US Dollars,” People’s Daily, August 28, 2007. 
6
 Source: Table 6-14, Table 14-1 and Table 18-13 of China Statistical Yearbook (2007), respectively. 
7
 Source: Table 18-15, China Statistical Yearbook (2007). 
8
 Most of the FDI from tax havens such as Virgin Islands are actually redirected to China by investors from 
other parts of the world, including Hong Kong and Taiwan. See Naughton (2007), p. 413. 
 7 
as Motorola, Samsung and Siemens. As a result, the share of HMT investment in total 
foreign investment declined from 47 percent in 1998 to 35 percent in 2006.
9
 
 
Nearly 70 percent of FDI in China was poured into the manufacturing sector. This is 
mainly due to the competitive edge of relatively low production cost in China for 
manufacturing. The other reason is that FDI in service sector until recently has not been 
fully liberalized (Branstetter and Lardy, 2008). 
 
In the early 1980s, China’s FDI policies were mainly characterized by setting up new 
regulations to permit joint ventures between foreign investors and local partners and 
setting up Special Economic Zones. During this period, FDI inflow was low and 
remained roughly constant. Since 1986, China started to further open up to FDI and 
adopted more favorable policies to encourage FDI inflow. Foreign investors were given 
preferential tax treatments, the freedom to import inputs, and simpler business licensing 
procedures.  In the 1990s, Chinese government permitted wholly foreign-owned 
enterprise as a new entry mode of FDI. During the past few years, wholly foreign-owned 
enterprises have become the most popular form of entry mode FDI to China, representing 
69 percent of total FDI in 2006.
10
 Most recently, the government started to allow, and in 
some cases even encourage, foreign investors to merge with or acquire domestic firms. 
As a result, more and more new FDI projects take the form of merger or acquisition. In 
many cases, the target firms are either state owned enterprises or other leading and 
promising companies.
11
 
 
One of the primary goals of China’s FDI policies is to promote technology transfer to 
China, especially from multinational companies. Indeed, promotion of technology 
transfer is of the key ingredients of the Guiding Directory on Industries Open to Foreign 
Investment first promulgated in 1995.
12
 Since the mid-1990s, China has been encouraging 
FDI to flow into cutting-edge, technology-oriented industries such as electronic 
                                                 
9
 Source: Table 18-15, China Statistical Yearbook (2007). 
10
 Source: Table 18-16, China Statistical Yearbook (2007). 
11
 Source: “Foreign M&As created problems,” China Daily, November 12, 2007. 
12
 Source: see http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI/default.htm. 
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information, bioengineering, new materials, and aviation and aerospace, as well as 
establishing local R&D centers.
13
 This should help generate horizontal spillovers via such 
channels as labor turnovers and demonstration effect, as well as vertical spillovers. A 
policy designed specifically to promote backward linkage effect of FDI is the so-called 
local content requirement, which requires a foreign investor to purchase a certain amount 
of intermediate input from local suppliers as opposed to from international markets. For 
instance, during the 1990s China required that the local content rate of all cars made in 
China be at least 40 percent and must increase to 60 percent in a year and to 80 percent in 
two years after operation of a project.
14
 In 2007, China issued its new set of guidelines for 
FDI detailing sectors in which it will either promote, restrict or ban foreign investment. 
The National Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of Commerce said 
that the new guidelines will help put FDI to better use to spur innovation, promote 
industrial restructuring and ease regional imbalance.
15
  
 
There are a number of studies of FDI spillover effects in China in recent years. Cheung 
and Lin (2003) examine the spillover effects of FDI on innovation activity of domestic 
firms in China. The authors use the panel data for the 26 provinces and 4 administrative 
cities of China for the period from 1995 to 2000, and find that inward FDI has significant 
and positive effects on the number of patent applications filed by domestic firms in China. 
This is true for all three types of patent (invention, utility model, and external design), 
although the spillover effect is the strongest for minor innovations such as external design. 
Hu and Jefferson (2002) focus on horizontal spillovers effects of FDI in China’s 
electronic and textile industries. Using the data of large and medium enterprises, the 
authors find that inward FDI has a positive effect on introduction of new products in 
China. Using data on 29 manufacturing industries from 1993 to 1998 in Shenzhen Special 
Economic Zone of China, Liu (2002) finds that FDI has large and positive spillover 
effects on productivity of manufacturing industries.  
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 See Long (2005) for a recent review of China’s FDI policy. 
14
 Source: China Daily, July 15, 2004. 
15
 Source: Wall Street Journal, November 8, 2007, C2. 
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More recently, Abraham, Konings and Slootmaekers (2006) use a panel of 17, 645 plants 
in China to study FDI spillovers. They look at horizontal spillovers only and find that 
FDI from HMT firms generates positive spillovers whereas that from other 
countries/regions generates negative effects. Girma, Gong and Görg (2006) use a firm-
level panel dataset and find that inward FDI has a negative effect on the innovative 
activity in China’s state-owned enterprises. They also find that the FDI effect is positive 
for those state-owned enterprises that export, invest in human capital and R&D, or have 
prior innovation experience. 
 
4. Measurement and Data 
4.1 Measuring Horizontal Spillovers 
As in Javorcik (2004), the variable jtHorizontal  measures the foreign presence in the 
firms’ own industry j at time t. It is calculated as follows: 
,
 






ji
it
ji
itit
jt
Y
YShareForeign
Horizontal    (1) 
where itShareForeign  is define as the share of firm i’s total equity owned by foreign 
investors, and Yit is its output, for all firms in industry j. To be consistent with the 
definition of vertical spillover variables, instead of using four-digit industries, we use the 
manufacturing industries defined in 2002 Input-Output Table for horizontal spillover 
variable.
16
 There are in total 122 industries in 2002 Input-Output Table (National Bureau 
of Statistics, 2006), of which 72 are in manufacturing. After excluding the industry of 
recycling and disposal of waste, we obtain 71 manufacturing industries for both 
horizontal and vertical spillover variables. 
 
 
4.2 Measuring Backward Spillovers 
                                                 
16
 China compiles its national input-output table every five years. The 1997 Input-Output table is before our 
sample period. We also run parallel regressions using the 1997 table for 1998-2000 and 2002 table for 
2001-2005; the results are qualitatively similar to those reported in the paper.  
 10 
jtBackward captures the foreign presence in the downstream industries that are supplied 
by industry j. Since our dataset does not provide information about backward linkage at 
firm level, we use backward linkage value of the firm’s industry. In particular, we have 
 
,


jk
ktjkjt HorizontalBackward       (2)  
where jk is the proportion of industry j’s total intermediate use that is purchased by 
industry k.
17
 We exclude the purchase by its own industry because we have already 
included jtHorizontal in the regression. We calculate jk using Table 5.1 of 2002 Input-
Output table. 
 
4.3 Measuring Forward Spillovers 
Similarly, jtForward  shows the foreign presence in the upstream industries from which 
industry j purchases its intermediate inputs. As only intermediates sold in the domestic 
market are relevant to this study, goods produced by foreign invested firms for exports 
are excluded. Thus, we calculate jtForward  in the following way: 





 


mi
itit
mi
ititit
jm
jmjt
EXY
EXYreForeignSha
Forward
)(
)(
   (3) 
where jm  is the proportion of industry j’s total intermediate input that is supplied by 
industry m, and itEX  is the exports of each firm i in industry m. As above, 
itShareForeign  is the share of firm i’s total equity owned by foreign investors. Again the 
coefficient jm is computed based on Table 5.1 of 2002 Input-Output Table. 
 
 
4.4 The Data  
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 For example, suppose industry A sells 10% of its output to industry B, 30% to industry C and 60% to 
industry D, where Foreign Share is 30%, 20% and 25%, respectively. In this example, Backward of 
industry A = 0.1×0.3 + 0.3×0.2 + 0.6×0.25 = 0.24. 
 11 
This empirical study uses a large dataset of Chinese industrial firms built from cross-
sectional data collected in regular surveys by China National Bureau of Statistics between 
1998 and 2005. The surveys cover all state-owned firms and all non-state firms above 
designated scale. Only non-state firms with sales under 5 million Yuan are excluded. The 
number of firms covered by this dataset is 124,944 in 1998 and 243,974 in 2005, 
respectively. The industry section of China Statistical Yearbook is complied based on this 
dataset. China Markets Yearbook which reports the basic information of each four-digit 
industry is also based on this dataset. The dataset contains detailed information of about 
100 variables, including ID number, address, ownership, output, value added, four-digit 
industry code, six-digit geographic code, exports, employment, capital stock, and 
intermediate inputs. The firms in our sample account for 57 percent of total industrial 
value added in 1998 and 94 percent in 2005.
18
  
 
Since we only focus on manufacturing, we exclude mining and utilities industries. 
Moreover, we delete those observations with missing values and those that fail to satisfy 
some basic error checks. In addition, we trim top 1% and bottom 1% of TFP for each 
year to remove the effects of outliers. Summary statistics of domestic firms are reported 
in Table 1. 
 
We construct a panel dataset by matching the firms in different years. In our dataset, each 
firm is assigned a unique numerical ID. However, a firm may change its ID if it went 
through restructuring, merger or acquisition. Therefore, in addition to matching by IDs, 
we also match the firms using a combination of firm name, founding year, geographic 
code, industry code and address. 
 
Table 2 shows total number of foreign invested firms in each year. There is a jump in 
total number of firms between 2003 and 2004. This is because 2004 is a census year. 
Some firms that should be surveyed but were not surveyed in previous years were 
included in 2004 sample. In our dataset, the share of foreign invested firms increased 
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 This is calculated from dividing the total value added in the dataset by the industrial GDP in the China 
Statistical Yearbook. 
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steadily from 17% in 1998 to 22% in 2005. In fact, we can see that the share of HMT 
firms is relatively stable while that of Non-HMT firms has been rising during this eight-
year period. 
 
Appendix 1 reports backward, forward and horizontal spillover variables in 1998 and 
2005 for all manufacturing sectors in 2002 input-output table. As shown by the table, 
there is significant variation of all three spillover variables across sectors. For example, in 
1998 horizontal ranges from 0 in tobacco products to 0.84 in stationary and office 
machinery. For all sectors, the values of both backward and forward have increased 
during 1998-2005, whereas horizontal spillovers have increased for almost all the sectors 
except for six of the 71 sectors. These trends indicate an economy-wide increase in the 
presence of foreign direct investment and their linkages with domestic firms in China 
during the sample period. We would like to note that vertical linkages may not 
automatically rise simply because more and more FDI flows into China (i.e., as 
horizontal FDI increases). Foreign companies in the host country may choose to source 
their intermediate goods internationally, e.g. from their parent companies abroad, rather 
than buying them domestically in the host country. Similarly, these foreign companies 
may choose to sell products (as final products for consumption or intermediate goods) in 
the international markets. Therefore, it is conceivable that vertical linkages could become 
weakened as horizontal linkages enhance in the host country, at least for some industries. 
However, it is not the case in China, as Appendix 1 shows.
19
  
 
4.5 A Descriptive Analysis: Comparing Domestic Firms and Foreign Invested Firms 
To compare foreign invested firms with Chinese domestic firms, as preliminary 
exploration, we estimate the following equation:
20
 
 
, ln 10 irjii ShareForeignS      (4) 
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 Alfaro and Rodriguez-Clare (2004) propose to use the ratio of the value of inputs bought domestically by 
FDI firms to the total workers employed by the firm as an alternative indicator of vertical linkages. Our 
dataset does not provide firm-level information about vertical linkage.  
20
 This is only a simple descriptive exercise for illustrative purposes. 
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where iS  refers to firm i’s characteristics, including output, labor productivity (defined as 
value-added per worker), capital intensity, and wage. We estimate (4) separately for each 
year in our sample. In the regression, we include two-digit industry ( j ) and provincial 
dummies ( r ).  
 
The estimation results reported in Table 3 suggest that foreign invested firms differ 
significantly from domestic firms. The percentage differential between a wholly foreign-
owned firm (Foreign Share = 1) and a domestic firm (Foreign Share = 0) can be 
calculated from the estimated coefficient as )1)(exp(*100 1  . For example, in 1998, the 
labor productivity of a wholly foreign-owned firm is on average 86 percent 
( )1)62.0(exp(*100  ) higher than that of a domestic firm. In general, foreign invested 
firms are larger, more productive, more capital intensive, and pay higher wages. Such 
findings are consistent with previous studies on other countries. We also find that in our 
sample period these differences between foreign invested firms and domestic firms 
gradually decreased over time.  
 
5. Empirical Strategy 
To investigate the relationship between FDI and the productivity of domestic firms, we 
follow an approach that is commonly used in the literature (e.g., Aitken and Harrison, 
1999). We estimate a production function that includes spillovers measures and industry 
concentration as explanatory variables. Our starting point is the following equation: 
 
       jtitititit HorizontalMKLY 13210 lnlnlnln     
itjjtjt CRForwardBackward   8432                     (5) 
 
where itY  is the real output of firm i at time t, which is deflated by industry-specific ex-
factory price index. itL  is the number of employees. itK  stands for the net value of fixed 
assets deflated by investment price index. The deflators of output and capital stock are 
 14 
calculated based on the price information in Table 9-1 of China Statistical Yearbook 
(2006).  
 
As Javorcik (2004) points out, foreign entry could change industry concentration and 
indirectly affect firm productivity. Here we adopt an alternative approach, by including 
industry concentration as an independent variable parallel to FDI spillovers. Following 
the logic of the standard Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm, we take the view that 
industry concentration is an important determinant of firm conduct, thus affecting the 
intensity of market competition, firm incentive for innovation and technological 
upgrading, and having a direct effect on firm TFP.  
 
There are two econometric concerns with the estimation of (5). The first is the omission 
of unobservable firm-specific variables. These variables may affect the correlation 
between firm productivity and FDI presence. Examples include government subsidies 
and strong senior management team. Our solution to this problem is to use panel data 
models to control for firm fixed effects. 
 
The second econometric problem is that OLS is biased when estimating the production 
function in (5) because labor and intermediate inputs are not exogenous. Griliches and 
Mairesse (1998) argue that inputs should be endogenous since they are chosen by firms 
after productivity is observed. If this is the case, the error term of the production function 
can influence factor inputs, which makes OLS estimates biased. To correct the 
endogeneity bias, Olley and Pakes (1996) propose using investment as a proxy for the 
unobservable productivity shock. The identifying assumption in Olley-Pakes estimation 
is that investment is monotonically increasing with respect to the shock, conditional on 
capital. Because capital responds to the shock only in a lagged fashion through 
contemporaneous investment, the return to the other inputs can be obtained by non-
parametrically inverting investment and capital to proxy for the unobserved shock.  
 
Since the Olley-Pakes procedure requires the information of investment which is not 
available in our dataset, we opt for the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) procedure, which 
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uses intermediate inputs rather than investment to address the underlying endogeneity 
issues.
21
 There are two advantages for the Levinsohn-Petrin procedure. First, because 
there is substantial adjustment cost with capital stock, in many firm-level datasets, a large 
number of observations have zero investment. These observations must be deleted to 
satisfy the strict monotonicity condition. The Levinsohn-Petrin procedure can avoid this 
problem since the intermediate inputs must be positive. Second, intermediate inputs 
provide a better proxy for productivity shock than investment because investment does 
not respond to the productivity shock quickly enough due to the adjustment cost.  
 
 The Levinsohn-Petrin procedure is implemented in this paper using the Stata module 
“levpet” developed by Petrin, Levinsohn and Poi (2004). To allow for different 
technologies across sectors, we perform the procedure for each industry separately. The 
measure of TFP is thus calculated as follows: 
 
,lnˆlnˆlnln itkitlitit KLVTFP       (6) 
 
where itV  is the value added of firm i at time t, and lˆ and kˆ are the estimated 
coefficients of labor and capital from Levinsohn-Petrin procedure. 
 
In summary, we estimate panel data models for the following equation: 
 
itijjtjtjtit CRForwardBackwardHorizontalTFP   8ln 43210 ,    (7) 
 
where itTFPln  is obtained from equation (6), and i  is the unobservable firm fixed effect.  
 
                                                 
21 Although semi-parametric method has been a more standard approach to the TFP estimation with firm 
panel data (see, for example, Pavcnik (2002) and Javorcik (2004)), it has been recently criticized by 
Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2007). They investigate the identification strategy for the semiparametric 
estimator and argue that the first stage of both Olley-Pakes and Levinsohn-Petrin procedures suffers from a 
collinearity problem. 
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As Moulton (1990) illustrates, the traditional OLS method is based upon the assumption 
of independent disturbances, which is not appropriate for disturbances with grouped 
structure. As a result, OLS method can lead to standard errors that are seriously biased 
downward. This can in turn result in spurious findings of statistical significance for the 
aggregate variables of interest. To overcome this problem, throughout the paper we report 
standard errors that are corrected for sector-year clustering.
22
  
 
6. Estimation Results 
6.1 Baseline Specifications 
To get a first feeling of the FDI spillover effects, we start with regression results in 
equation (5). Table 4 reports the estimation results with lnY as the dependent variable. 
Although the Hausman test favors the random effect model, in all four cases, the 
coefficients on backward and forward are both positive and statistically significant at the 
1% level. Horizontal coefficients are negative but not statistically significant. A possible 
explanation for this is that the potential positive spillover effect and the negative 
crowding-out effect on domestic competitors, as discussed in Section 2, are canceling out, 
leading to the non-significant result in our estimation. When we add industry 
concentration into equation (5), we find its effect is also negative, in both fixed effect and 
random effect models. Throughout the paper, we find negative and significant 
coefficients on CR8, which implies that competition (or lower industry concentration) 
tends to raise firms’ TFP. 
 
In Table 5, we report the estimation results of equation (7). The dependent variable is 
lnTFP, which is calculated through Levinsohn-Petrin procedure. Although we believe the 
estimation results of equation (5) in Table 4 are biased due to the endogeneity problem of 
firm’s input decision, we find that the results of equation (7) are qualitatively similar to 
those of equation (5). Again, positive and significant coefficients on backward and 
                                                 
22
 In addition to clustering, the error term may be heteroskedastic due to the two-sage nature of our method. 
Since the dependent variable, lnTFP, is based on TFP estimation regression, the error term in equation (7) 
may depend on the errors from TFP regression. See Maddala (2001, p.64) for more discussion. 
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forward are found for all models. Horizontal bears a negative sign and remains 
statistically insignificant. Industry concentration is negative and significant at the 1% 
level. A notable difference is that the coefficients of backward and forward in Table 5 are 
larger than those in Table 4. 
 
The vertical spillover effects are also quantitatively significant. For example, if we use 
the results in the fourth column of Table 5, for backward spillover variable, a one-
standard-deviation (10 percentage points) increase in the foreign presence in the 
downstream industries is associated with about 12 percent increase in TFP of the 
domestic firms in the supplying industry 
 
6.2 Export Orientation 
It has been suggested that the market orientation of the foreign invested firms is likely to 
affect both horizontal and vertical spillovers (Sgard, 2001; Javorcik, 2004; Girma et al., 
2007). First, domestic-market-oriented foreign invested firms take market share directly 
from domestic firms, while export-oriented foreign invested firms that target international 
markets tend to put less pressure on domestic competitors. Second, export-oriented 
foreign invested firms are often part of global production network. They usually depend 
on the suppliers from their parent company or their affiliates in other countries. Therefore, 
export-oriented foreign invested firms may be more likely to generate (positive) 
horizontal spillovers but not vertical spillovers. 
 
To test this hypothesis, we distinguish three types of foreign invested firms in each year: 
(1) domestic-market oriented foreign invested firms with export/sales ratio below 20%; 
(2) no orientation foreign invested firms with export/sales ratio between 20% and 80%; 
(3) export-oriented foreign invested firms with export/sales ratio exceeding 80%. For 
each type of FDI, we recalculate spillover variables in equations (1), (2) and (3) using the 
new Foreign Share variable which includes the foreign invested firms of that type only. 
Then we re-estimate equation (7) with our newly constructed spillover variables.  
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The estimation results in Table 6 indicate that in terms of productivity spillovers, export-
oriented foreign invested firms are not very different from domestic-market-oriented 
foreign invested firms in that we find the same positive backward and forward spillovers. 
However, in both the fixed effect and random effect models, the magnitude of such 
vertical spillovers becomes weaker as the export/sales ratio of foreign invested firms rises. 
This is consistent with the view that the availability of vertical linkages outside China 
tends to reduce the backward and forward spillover effects that FDI can generate to 
domestic suppliers or customers. Despite this, all foreign invested firms with different 
export orientation still generate positive and significant vertical spillover effects in China. 
Regarding horizontal effects, the result is similar to that in the baseline regressions: the 
spillover is negative but not statistically significant. 
 
6.3 Source of FDI  
In a much cited paper, Sachs and Woo (1994), when comparing the economic experience 
of China and Russia, emphasized that investment from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan 
played a critical role in China’s economic success. Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan are 
among newly industrialized economies, and their investments in China account for about 
40 percent of China’s overall FDI during the sample period. The investors from these 
regions have additional advantages of same culture, same language, geographical 
proximity, and even family ties, which tend to facilitate FDI spillovers. Tong (2005) 
shows that ethnic Chinese networks play an important role in promoting cross-border 
investment. Compared with HMT firms, the advantages of Non-HMT firms lie in their 
more advanced technology, global production chain and internationally recognized brand 
names. Therefore, it is not clear a priori which type of foreign invested firms is more 
likely to generate spillovers to domestic firms in China. 
 
To investigate whether there exist different impacts of HMT and Non-HMT invested 
firms, we estimate equation (7) with these two types of FDI. Spillover variables are 
constructed using a new modified Foreign Share variable, which is now defined as the 
share of firm’s equity owned by HMT or Non-HMT firms.  
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The results from the regressions are reported in Panel A of Table 7. We find robust 
evidence of forward spillovers from both HMT and Non-HMT firms, which is consistent 
with our previous findings. However, it seems that the forward spillover effects are 
stronger for Non-HMT FDI since its coefficient is larger. The coefficient of backward 
spillover variable is statistically significant only for Non-HMT FDI. The most interesting 
finding is that the coefficient of horizontal is negative and significant for HMT FDI but 
positive and significant for FDI from other economies in both fixed effect and random 
effect models. That is, the negative competition effects dominate the positive 
technological spillovers for FDI originated from HMT, whereas the reverse is true for 
Non-HMT FDI. One possible explanation for this finding is that HMT firms tend to be 
more labor intensive and produce closer substitutes to products of Chinese domestic 
firms.
23
 This implies a stronger crowding-out effect on Chinese firms by HMT firms, 
relative to Non-HMT firms. This finding is similar to that of Tong and Hu (2003) who 
used data from the Third National Industrial Census of China in 1995. These authors 
interpret the negative horizontal effects of HMT FDI as a result of direct competition 
with domestic firms.
24
 We thus observe negative horizontal effects from HMT FDI and 
positive such effects from Non-HMT FDI. Once these two sources of FDI are lumped 
together, however, the aggregate horizontal effects of FDI turn out to be insignificant.  
 
We further conduct formal tests (F-tests for fixed effects models and Wald tests for 
random effects models) to see if each of three HMT effects are statistically different from 
their corresponding Non-HMT effects. Panel B of Table 7 reports the F-statistics/Chi-
Square statistics and p-values individually for each effect and jointly for all three. In all 
cases, we reject the null hypotheses and conclude that these three effects are statistically 
different between HMT FDI and Non-HMT FDI. 
 
6.4 Ownership of Domestic Firms  
Enterprise reform is arguably the central problem in the entire transition process 
(Naughton, 2007, Chapter 13). State-owned enterprises (SOEs) were the “commanding 
                                                 
23
 HMT FDI tends to enter such labor intensive industries as garments, footwear, and light electronics in 
China. See Zhang (2005) for a detailed analysis of HMT FDI in China.  
24
 These authors did not consider vertical spillovers (either backward or forward). 
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heights” of the old planned economy, and today even after several rounds of privatization 
SOEs are still far from extinct. Indeed, in our sample, the share of SOEs in total industrial 
output decreased only slightly from 44.3 percent in 1998 to 38.3 percent in 2005. Large 
state enterprises in particular still play an important role in today’s Chinese economy. In 
our study of FDI spillovers, it would be interesting to know whether the ownership of 
domestic firms matters. First, according to recent study by Jefferson, Rawski and Zhang 
(2008), SOEs are the least efficient firms in China in terms of productivity. If the 
technological gap between foreign firms and SOEs is too large, SOEs may lack the 
ability needed to learn from the foreign firms. Second, the entry of foreign firms often 
breaks the monopoly of SOEs, making them particularly vulnerable to the crowding-out 
effects brought by FDI. Third, a key motivation of China’s FDI policy after reform is to 
improve the technological level of the SOEs by learning from FDI (Long, 2005). 
 
To examine the issue, we divide all domestic firms into two sub-samples: SOEs and Non-
SOEs.
25
 We estimate equation (7) separately for each sub-sample. The first four columns 
of Table 8 report the estimation results for SOEs. In all models, horizontal appears 
negative but statistically insignificant. The coefficients on backward and forward have 
positive signs and are statistically significant at the 1% level. The regression results from 
the Non-SOEs sample in the last four columns show similar pattern. However, the 
coefficients of both vertical spillover variables are larger for SOEs sample, indicating that 
the SOEs do not lack the capacity to learn from foreign invested suppliers and customers. 
  
6.5 Interpretation and Comparison with Existing Studies 
As mentioned earlier, there are a number of empirical studies of the spillovers effects of 
FDI to China in recent years.  All of these studies examine the FDI spillovers effects 
without making distinguishing horizontal spillovers and vertical spillovers, with the 
exception of Girma, Gong and Gorg (2006). We contribute to the literature in three ways. 
First, we explicitly separate horizontal spillovers and vertical spillovers, and backward 
linkages and forward linkages, by using the latest input-output table of China. Second, we 
                                                 
25
 The data report over 25 different ownership categories. We include the following categories as SOEs:  
110, 141, 143, 151, 159, 160. 
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look at the spillover effects of FDI from different sources, namely FDI from HMT and 
FDI from other countries. The investments from HMT differ from the Non-HMT FDI not 
only in culture background, but also in terms of market orientation and technology 
background (Zhang, 2005). Third, we use the panel data set from the National Bureau of 
Statistics covering all the manufacturing firms in China with scales above the designated 
level. Specifically, most of the existing studies are based on much smaller data sets. For 
instance, Hu and Jefferson (2002) use data from electronic and textile industries, whereas 
Liu (2002) used data for firms in Shenzhen City in South China. While Cheung and Lin 
(2003) use data that cover the whole country, their data are at provincial level only.  
 
By separating horizontal and vertical spillover effects, and HMT FDI from Non-HMT 
FDI, we are able to find much finer evidence of the FDI spillovers in China. Foreign 
investment in China has impacted Chinese domestic firms differently: Suppliers and 
customers of foreign invested firms in China have enjoyed positive spillovers via 
backward linkages and forward linkages, whereas direct competitors to foreign invested 
firms have suffered from negative (but not significant) competition effects. This is in 
contrast with the findings of Liu (2002) who lumped horizontal spillovers and vertical 
spillovers together and found positive spillovers on the aggregate.  
 
Girma, Gong and Gorg (2006) is the only existing study that examines the horizontal and 
vertical spillovers in China separately, to the best of our knowledge. They find negative 
horizontal spillovers and no vertical spillovers on the innovation activities of SOEs in 
China. The major difference is that we use firms’ TFP as our dependent variable, while 
Girma Gong and Gorg (2006) use new product sales as a measure for R&D output of 
domestic firms. While product R&D is closely related to firm TFP, a firm can improve its 
productivity without its own R&D. For example, firms can purchase advanced 
technology and learn from foreign firms. Labor turnover is another important channel via 
which FDI spillovers can take place.
26
 To further compare our results with Girma Gong 
and Gorg (2006), we also run regressions for the SOEs in our sample (see Section 6.4). 
                                                 
26
 Another difference is that we use the 2002 Input-Output Table of China whereas Girma, Gong and 
Gorg(2006)  use the 1997 Input-Output Table.  
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Once again, we find that the horizontal effects of FDI on Chinese SOEs are negative (as 
in Girma Gong and Gorg (2006)) but not significant and that both backward and forward 
linkage effects on SOEs are positive and significant, similar to our findings for the full 
sample of both SOEs and non-SOE firms.  
 
Once the origin of FDI is taken into consideration, we find that FDI from OECD has 
generated positive spillovers to China while HMT FDI brought negative spillovers. Our 
result is consistent with the findings of Tong and Hu (2003) as mentioned earlier. 
However, this is in contrast to the findings of Abraham, Konings, and Slootmaekers 
(2006) which find exactly the opposite evidence. An obvious difference between our 
study and Abraham, Konings, and Slootmaekers (2006) is the different datasets used.
27
 
The second major difference is that their study does not consider vertical spillovers. Their 
interpretation of their results is that HMT firms in China are mostly export oriented, 
while Non-HMT firms engage in head-to-head competition with domestic firms. Our 
explanation of our findings is different. We believe the technological gap between 
Chinese firms and HMT firms are not as large as that with firms from OECD countries. 
As a result, competition between Chinese firms with HMT firms is much more intense 
than with OECD firms.  
 
We also examine the spillovers effects of FDI with different degree of exporting 
orientation, which has not been studied in the literature. As reported earlier, we find that 
both the backward and forward spillovers in China decline with the export orientation of 
foreign invested firms. This is not surprising because export oriented foreign firms are 
more likely to source intermediate goods overseas and work with downstream customers 
in the international markets, thereby leading to weaker vertical linkages in the host 
country. 
     
 
 
 
                                                 
27
 They data, drawn from the Oriana CD-Rom complied by Bureau van Dijk, covers firms that are either 
publicly listed or with turnovers at least US$10 million or with more than 150 employees.  
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7. Conclusions 
 
This paper is among the first to analyze productivity spillovers from foreign direct 
investment using firm-level panel data from China manufacturing industries and most 
recent Input-Output Table of China. We investigate whether there exit productivity 
spillovers from FDI to domestic firms through horizontal, backward and forward linkages. 
We apply the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method to the estimation of TFP, which 
allows us to control for the potential endogeneity of input factors.  
 
Our estimation results produce robust findings that support forward spillovers from all 
types of FDI, regardless of the motivation of FDI (exported oriented vs. domestic market 
oriented), the source of FDI (HMT vs. Non-HMT) and the ownership type of domestic 
firms (SOEs vs. non-SOEs). We find strong evidence of backward spillovers from Non-
HMT foreign invested firms. Regarding horizontal effects, we find negative spillovers 
from FDI originated from Hong Kong, Macao or Taiwan, and generally positive 
spillovers from non-HMT firms (mostly the OECD countries). Domestic-market oriented 
FDI do not show much difference with export-oriented FDI in terms of spillovers effects 
on Chinese firms.  
 
Overall, our findings represent strong evidence that FDI has generated beneficial vertical 
spillover effects to Chinese domestic firms. The horizontal spillovers depend on the 
origin of FDI, and tend to cancel out on the aggregate in our dataset.  We also find that 
industry concentration has a negative effect on firm productivity, i.e., that market 
competition enhances technological progress. These findings suggest that China’s policy 
of opening up to FDI and introducing market competition in its industries has indeed 
produced quantitatively measurable benefits in terms of total factor productivity. 
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Figure 1: FDI Inflow into China (1983-2006) 
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Source: Table 18-14 of China Statistical Yearbook (2006) and Statistical Communiqué of the People’s 
Republic of China on the 2006 National Economic and Social Development. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Domestics Firms 
 
 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Number of 
Domestic Firms 
103,102 109,126 104,467 116,646 124,997 136,706 194,815 189,809 
Output 
38,632 
(246,195) 
42,051 
(278,611) 
46,769 
(332,378) 
48,920 
(359,666) 
54,761 
(400,931) 
61,712 
(465,350) 
54,616 
(468,451) 
66,253 
(573,500) 
Employment 
358 
(1,326) 
347 
(1,308) 
329 
(1,295) 
290 
(1,126) 
278 
(1,088) 
260 
(975) 
200 
(751) 
209 
(832) 
Capital 
19,866 
(219,151) 
21,984 
(27,7172) 
22,583 
(257,137) 
21,502 
(258,206) 
21,581 
(262,462) 
20,804 
(243,931) 
15,737 
(191,838) 
17,904 
(191,838) 
Intermediate 
Input 
29527 
(184,065) 
32,371 
(215,965) 
35,350 
(259,708) 
36,556 
(276,390) 
40,694 
(303,251) 
44,666 
(340,830) 
37,555 
(321,418) 
44,178 
(391,284) 
Value Added 
10,574 
(92,929) 
11,646 
(96,057) 
12,769 
(105,259) 
13,353 
(109,908) 
15,155 
(127,883) 
17,116 
(155,127) 
15,048 
(164,654) 
18,199 
(180,161) 
Backward 
0.087 
(0.066) 
0.093 
(0.072) 
0.098 
(0.075) 
0.103 
(0.078) 
0.103 
(0.078) 
0.111 
(0.082) 
0.126 
(0.088) 
0.124 
(0.089) 
Forward 
0.053 
(0.026) 
0.062 
(0.031) 
0.067 
(0.034) 
0.069 
(0.034) 
0.069 
(0.035) 
0.075 
(0.039) 
0.080 
(0.041) 
0.083 
(0.043) 
Horizontal 
0.177 
(0.103) 
0.191 
(0.109) 
0.205 
(0.114) 
0.214 
(0.117) 
0.214 
(0.113) 
0.223 
(0.120) 
0.242 
(0.124) 
0.240 
(0.125) 
 
Notes: China National Statistical Bureau Enterprise Database. This table shows the mean and standard 
deviation (in parentheses) of the variables. All financial variables are measured in 1998 constant price. The 
unit of all financial variables is 1,000 Yuan. 
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Table 2: Number of Firms in the Database 
 
 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Total Number of 
Firms 
124,944 133,976 130,295 146,254 156,930 173,511 249,075 243,974 
Total Number of 
Foreign Invested 
Firms 
21,842 
(17%) 
24,850 
(19%) 
25,828 
(20%) 
29,608 
(20%) 
31,933 
(20%) 
36,805 
(21%) 
54,260 
(22%) 
54,165 
(22%) 
─   HMT Firms 
12,981 
(11%) 
14,721 
(12%) 
15,166 
(12%) 
17,317 
(12%) 
18,224 
(12%) 
20,297 
(12%) 
26,940 
(11%) 
26,669 
(11%) 
─  Non-HMT 
Firms 
8,861 
(7%) 
10,129 
(8%) 
10,662 
(8%) 
12,291 
(8%) 
13,709 
(9%) 
16,508 
(10%) 
27,320 
(11%) 
27,496 
(11%) 
 
Notes: China National Statistical Bureau Enterprise Database. HMT firms are partly or fully 
funded by investors from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan. Non-HMT firms are partly or fully 
funded by investors from foreign countries. Numbers in parentheses are the percentages of all 
firms. 
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Table 3:  Differentials of Characteristics between Foreign and Domestic Firms 
 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
ln(Output) 0.85 0.78 0.80 0.69 0.65 0.63 0.62 0.61 
ln(Value Added per 
Worker) 
0.62 0.50 0.43 0.31 0.26 0.17 0.12 0.08 
ln(Wage per Worker) 0.54 0.49 0.45 0.41 0.38 0.35 0.30 0.29 
ln(Captial per Worker) 0.94 0.84 0.74 0.73 0.66 0.59 0.56 0.49 
 
Notes: This table reports the coefficients of foreign share in Equation (4) of Section 4.5. All 
coefficients are significant at the 1% level. All regressions include a full set of sector and 
provincial dummies.  
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Table 4: Baseline Regression I 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Dependent Variable: lnY 
 
Fixed Effect 
Random 
Effect 
Fixed Effect 
Random 
Effect 
lnK 
0.030*** 
(0.001) 
0.029*** 
(0.001) 
0.030*** 
(0.001) 
0.029*** 
(0.001) 
lnL 
0.071*** 
(0.001) 
0.052*** 
(0.002) 
0.071*** 
(0.001) 
0.052*** 
(0.002) 
lnM 
0.833*** 
(0.003) 
0.884*** 
(0.002) 
0.832*** 
(0.003) 
0.884*** 
(0.002) 
Horizontal 
-0.035 
(0.031) 
-0.025 
(0.043) 
-0.044 
(0.031) 
-0.032 
(0.042) 
Forward 
1.714*** 
(0.115) 
0.664*** 
(0.131) 
1.718*** 
(0.112) 
0.702*** 
(0.129) 
Backward 
0.513*** 
(0.039) 
0.197*** 
(0.052) 
0.474*** 
(0.038) 
0.193*** 
(0.052) 
CR8 
  
-0.134*** 
(0.010) 
-0.066*** 
(0.017) 
 
Notes:  This table reports the estimation results of equation (5). Numbers in 
parentheses are standard errors corrected for sector/year clustering. Total number 
of observations is 1,048,386. * denotes statistical significance at the 0.10 level. 
** denotes statistical significance at the 0.05 level. *** denotes statistical 
significance at the 0.01 level. 
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Table 5: Baseline Regression II 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Dependent Variable: lnTFP 
 
Fixed Effect 
Random 
Effect 
Fixed Effect 
Random 
Effect 
Horizontal 
-0.086 
(0.079) 
-0.091 
(0.167) 
-0.106 
(0.078) 
-0.109 
(0.168) 
Forward 
4.560*** 
(0.305) 
2.799*** 
(0.484) 
4.563*** 
(0.300) 
2.892*** 
(0.482) 
Backward 
1.357*** 
(0.100) 
1.329*** 
(0.212) 
1.268*** 
(0.096) 
1.305*** 
(0.211) 
CR8   
-0.292*** 
(0.027) 
-0.215*** 
(0.064) 
 
Notes:  This table reports the estimation results of equation (7). Numbers in 
parentheses are standard errors corrected for sector/year clustering. Total 
number of observations is 1,048,386. * denotes statistical significance at the 
0.10 level. ** denotes statistical significance at the 0.05 level. *** denotes 
statistical significance at the 0.01 level. 
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Table 6:  Export Orientation of FDI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Export/Sales Ratio < 20% 
 
Export/Sales Ratio between 
20% and 80% 
 
Export/Sales Ratio > 80% 
 
Fixed Effect 
Random 
Effect 
 
Fixed Effect 
Random 
Effect 
 
Fixed Effect 
Random 
Effect 
Horizontal 
-0.363 
(0.205) 
-0.191 
(0.412) 
 
-0.110 
(0.142) 
-0.026 
(0.260) 
 
-0.261 
(0.151) 
-0.125 
(0.271) 
Forward 
7.014*** 
(0.785) 
6.452*** 
(1.232) 
 
5.732*** 
(0.656) 
4.114*** 
(0.829) 
 
3.058*** 
(0.540) 
2.229*** 
(0.567) 
Backward 
5.723*** 
(0.545) 
6.336*** 
(1.147) 
 
3.745*** 
(0.480) 
3.902*** 
(0.368) 
 
1.042** 
(0.494) 
1.274*** 
(0.391) 
CR8 
-0.353*** 
(0.026) 
-0.182*** 
(0.061) 
 
-0.313*** 
(0.034) 
-0.238*** 
(0.065) 
 
-0.342*** 
(0.030) 
-0.210*** 
(0.068) 
 
Notes:  This table reports the estimation results of equation (7) with three different measures of FDI. Numbers in 
parentheses are standard errors corrected for sector/year clustering. Total number of observations is 1,048,386. * denotes 
statistical significance at the 0.10 level. ** denotes statistical significance at the 0.05 level. *** denotes statistical 
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Table 7: Sources of FDI 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: lnTFP 
 Fixed  
Effect 
Random Effect 
Fixed  
Effect 
Random Effect 
Panel A: Regression Results 
1: Non-HMT 
Horizontal 
0.318** 
(0.126) 
0.550** 
(0.241) 
0.358*** 
(0.122) 
0.626*** 
(0.234) 
2: Non-HMT 
Forward 
5.361*** 
(0.527) 
3.288*** 
(0.865) 
5.877*** 
(0.519) 
3.412*** 
(0.859) 
3: Non-HMT 
Backward 
2.402*** 
(0.302) 
1.993*** 
(0.551) 
2.136*** 
(0.291) 
1.901*** 
(0.537) 
4: HMT 
Horizontal 
-0.706*** 
(0.142) 
-0.876*** 
(0.272) 
-0.773*** 
(0.139) 
-0.988*** 
(0.272) 
5: HMT 
Forward 
3.345*** 
(0.754) 
2.454** 
(0.969) 
2.846*** 
(0.845) 
2.559*** 
(0.952) 
6: HMT 
Backward 
-0.277 
(0.363) 
0.216 
(0.716) 
-0.134 
(0.352) 
0.376 
(0.702) 
CR8   
-0.318*** 
(0.026) 
-0.289*** 
(0.064) 
Panel B: Testing Linear Restrictions 
Hypotheses F-Statistics 
Chi-Square 
Statistics 
F-Statistics 
Chi-Square 
Statistics 
1 = 4 
22.17 
[0.000] 
13.98 
[0.000] 
28.45 
[0.000] 
18.70 
[0.000] 
2 = 5 
7.19 
[0.008] 
11.23 
[0.000] 
11.08 
[0.000] 
4.56 
[0.033] 
3 = 6 
17.80 
[0.000] 
5.60 
[0.0180] 
13.68 
[0.000] 
7.21 
[0.0076] 
1 = 4 
& 2 = 5 
& 4 = 6 
18.64 
[0.000] 
26.16 
[0.000] 
22.43 
[0.000] 
33.55 
[0.000] 
 
Notes: In Panel A, numbers in parentheses are standard errors corrected for sector/year 
clustering. In Panel B,   numbers in parentheses are p-values. Total number of observations is 
1,048,386. * denotes statistical significance at the 0.10 level. ** denotes statistical significance 
at the 0.05 level. *** denotes statistical significance at the 0.01 level. 
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Table 8: Ownership of Domestic Firms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 SOEs 
 
Non-SOEs 
 
Fixed 
Effect 
Random 
Effect 
Fixed 
Effect 
Random 
Effect 
 
Fixed 
Effect 
Random 
Effect 
Fixed 
Effect 
Random 
Effect 
Horizontal 
-0.069 
(0.101) 
-0.009 
(0.234) 
-0.086 
(0.156) 
-0.015 
(0.234) 
 
-0.124 
(0.075) 
-0.266** 
(0.136) 
-0.146 
(0.074) 
-0.267 
(0.139) 
Forward 
5.489*** 
(0.402) 
4.088*** 
(0.688) 
5.463*** 
(0.400) 
4.424*** 
(0.688) 
 
3.951*** 
(0.270) 
1.831*** 
(0.376) 
3.968*** 
(0.267) 
1.836*** 
(0.376) 
Backward 
1.468*** 
(0.132) 
1.632*** 
(0.307) 
1.336*** 
(0.131) 
1.586*** 
(0.304) 
 
1.271*** 
(0.095) 
0.919*** 
(0.166) 
1.204*** 
(0.093) 
0.918*** 
(0.167) 
CR8   
-0.344*** 
(0.031) 
-0.327*** 
(0.081) 
 
  
-0.241*** 
(0.025) 
-0.012*** 
(0.059) 
Notes: This table reports the estimation results of equation (7) with two subsamples: SOEs and Non-SOEs. Dependent variable is 
lnTFP. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors corrected for sector/year clustering. Total numbers of observations are 357,200 
for SOEs regression and 691,186 for Non-SOEs. * denotes statistical significance at the 0.10 level. ** denotes statistical 
significance at the 0.05 level. *** denotes statistical significance at the 0.01 level. 
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Appendix 1: Spillover Variables by Sector 
 
 
Sectors Backward98 Backward05 Forward98 Forward05 Horizontal98 Horizontal05 
Corn Milling 0.08 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.04 
Feed Processing 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.27 0.17 
Vegetable Oil Refining 0.11 0.13 0.01 0.01 0.20 0.31 
Sugar Refining  0.19 0.25 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.08 
Animal Slaughtering & Meat Processing 0.16 0.18 0.01 0.02 0.14 0.19 
Seafood Processing 0.09 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.17 0.20 
Other Food Products  0.06 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.27 0.29 
Wines, Spirits and Liquors  0.01 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.17 
Non-Alcoholic Beverage  0.01 0.01 0.07 0.09 0.21 0.42 
Tobacco Products  0.00 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.00 
Cotton and Chemical Fiber Spinning  0.15 0.17 0.03 0.04 0.11 0.15 
Wool Spinning 0.24 0.25 0.04 0.05 0.20 0.23 
Ramie, Linen, Hemp and Silk Processing 0.19 0.21 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.10 
Textile Product  0.25 0.28 0.06 0.10 0.14 0.26 
Knit Fabric, Knitting and Product Processing 0.22 0.23 0.07 0.10 0.31 0.32 
Apparel, Shoes and Hat Manufacturing 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.37 0.37 
Leather, Furs, Down and Related Products  0.06 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.40 0.43 
Wood Processing and Wood Products 0.07 0.10 0.03 0.04 0.21 0.16 
Furniture Manufacturing 0.03 0.04 0.09 0.10 0.29 0.43 
Paper Making and Paper Products 0.12 0.15 0.03 0.04 0.18 0.26 
Printing and Record Media Reproducing 0.03 0.05 0.10 0.16 0.19 0.24 
Stationery 0.03 0.05 0.11 0.16 0.28 0.40 
Toys, Sporting and Recreation Products  0.00 0.01 0.12 0.17 0.53 0.55 
Petroleum Refining 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.07 
Coke Melting 0.06 0.09 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.06 
Raw Chemical Materials  0.14 0.20 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.10 
Chemical Fertilizer 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.03 
Pesticide Manufacturing 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.09 0.06 0.12 
Coating, Printing Ink and Dyeing Materials 0.16 0.20 0.04 0.07 0.14 0.35 
Synthetic Materials 0.20 0.25 0.04 0.07 0.18 0.24 
Special Chemical Products 0.15 0.20 0.05 0.08 0.12 0.20 
Daily Chemical Products 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.10 0.33 0.53 
Pharmaceutical Products 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.06 0.15 0.18 
Chemical Fiber Manufacturing 0.15 0.17 0.05 0.08 0.19 0.17 
Rubber Products 0.14 0.19 0.04 0.07 0.21 0.30 
Plastic Products 0.15 0.20 0.07 0.11 0.30 0.34 
Cement, Lime and Gypsum 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.07 
Glass Products 0.21 0.31 0.04 0.07 0.13 0.20 
Ceramic Products 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.21 0.28 
Fireproof Products 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.07 
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Appendix 1: Spillover Variables by Sector (continued) 
 
 
Sectors Backward98 Backward05 Forward98 Forward05 Horizontal98 Horizontal05 
Other Nonmetal Products 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.13 
Iron Smelting 0.10 0.15 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.03 
Steel Smelting 0.09 0.16 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.09 
Steel Rolling Processing 0.09 0.13 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.13 
Alloy Iron Smelting 0.08 0.14 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.05 
Nonferrous Metal Smelting 0.13 0.19 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.05 
Nonferrous Metal Processing 0.17 0.24 0.04 0.05 0.12 0.18 
Metal Products 0.09 0.13 0.04 0.07 0.23 0.26 
Boiler and Motor Manufacturing 0.10 0.13 0.05 0.09 0.10 0.10 
Metal Processing machinery 0.13 0.19 0.07 0.12 0.09 0.13 
Other General Machinery  0.07 0.10 0.06 0.10 0.16 0.23 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing Machinery 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.10 0.02 0.07 
Other Special Machinery 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.12 0.13 0.22 
Railroad Transport Equipment 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.10 0.01 0.04 
Motor Vehicles 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.15 0.21 0.22 
Motor Vehicles Parts and Components 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.08 0.15 0.31 
Ship Building 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.12 0.06 0.09 
Other Transport Equipment Machinery 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.15 0.20 
Motors and Generators 0.13 0.18 0.07 0.12 0.20 0.29 
Household Electronic Appliance 0.06 0.09 0.10 0.15 0.25 0.32 
Other Electronic Machinery 0.15 0.21 0.09 0.13 0.19 0.29 
Communication Equipment 0.06 0.08 0.13 0.25 0.46 0.64 
Computer Body 0.03 0.04 0.26 0.45 0.27 0.94 
Computer Accessories 0.16 0.51 0.20 0.36 0.73 0.88 
Electronic Device 0.39 0.59 0.07 0.10 0.48 0.75 
Household Video and Audio Equipment 0.02 0.03 0.19 0.35 0.42 0.59 
Other Communication and Electronic Equipment 0.15 0.22 0.16 0.28 0.46 0.49 
Instruments and Meters  0.06 0.08 0.11 0.18 0.27 0.40 
Stationary and Office Machinery 0.02 0.02 0.16 0.30 0.84 0.90 
Arts and Crafts Products 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.10 0.28 0.32 
Other Manufacturing Products 0.12 0.16 0.06 0.09 0.21 0.30 
 
